On the Role of Artificial Noise in Training and Data Transmission for
  Secret Communications by Liu, Ta-Yuan et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
51
1.
01
79
1v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  5
 N
ov
 20
15
1
On the Role of Artificial Noise in Training and
Data Transmission for Secret Communications
Ta-Yuan Liu, Shih-Chun Lin, and Y.-W. Peter Hong
Abstract
This work considers the joint design of training and data transmission in physical-layer secret
communication systems, and examines the role of artificial noise (AN) in both of these phases. In
particular, AN in the training phase is used to prevent the eavesdropper from obtaining accurate channel
state information (CSI) whereas AN in the data transmission phase can be used to mask the transmission
of the confidential message. By considering AN-assisted training and secrecy beamforming schemes,
we first derive bounds on the achievable secrecy rate and obtain a closed-form approximation that
is asymptotically tight at high SNR. Then, by maximizing the approximate achievable secrecy rate,
the optimal power allocation between signal and AN in both training and data transmission phases is
obtained for both conventional and AN-assisted training based schemes. We show that the use of AN
is necessary to achieve a high secrecy rate at high SNR, and its use in the training phase can be more
efficient than that in the data transmission phase when the coherence time is large. However, at low
SNR, the use of AN provides no advantage since CSI is difficult to obtain in this case. Numerical results
are presented to verify our theoretical claims.
Index Terms
Secrecy, wiretap channel, channel estimation, artificial noise, power allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information-theoretic secrecy has received renewed interest in recent years, especially in
the context of wireless communications, due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium
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2and the increasing amount of confidential data that is being transmitted over the air. Most of
these studies stem from the seminal works by Wyner in [1] and by Csiszar and Korner in [2],
where the so-called secrecy capacity was characterized for degraded and nondegraded discrete
memoryless wiretap channels (i.e., channels consisting of a source, a destination, and a passive
eavesdropper), respectively. The notion of secrecy capacity was introduced in these works as the
maximum achievable secrecy rate between the source and the destination subject to a constraint
on the information attainable by the eavesdropper. These issues were also examined for Gaussian
channels by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman in [3], where Gaussian signalling was shown to
be optimal. These works show that the secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel increases with the
difference between the channel quality at the destination and that at the eavesdropper.
In recent years, studies of the wiretap channel have also been extended to multi-antenna wire-
less systems, e.g., in [4]–[8], where the achievable secrecy rates were examined under different
channel assumptions and techniques were proposed to best utilize the available spatial degrees of
freedom. In particular, the work in [4] examined the secrecy capacity of a multiple-input single-
output (MISO) wiretap channel and showed that transmit beamforming with Gaussian signalling
is optimal. However, perfect knowledge of both the main and the eavesdropper channel state
information (CSI) was required at the source in order to determine the optimal beamformer. In
[5]–[8], more general results were obtained for cases with multiple antennas at the destination.
Precoding techniques were proposed as a generalization of the beamforming scheme in [4] to
higher dimensions and, thus, perfect CSI of all links was also required to derive the optimal
precoder. On the other hand, when the eavesdropper CSI is unavailable, which is often the
case in practice, the secrecy capacity and its corresponding optimal transmission scheme are
both unknown. However, an artificial noise (AN) assisted secrecy beamforming scheme, where
data is beamformed towards the destination and AN is placed in the null space of the main
channel direction to jam the eavesdropper’s reception, is often adopted and was in fact shown
to be asymptotically optimal in [4]. Even though knowledge of the eavesdropper channel is not
required in this transmission scheme, perfect knowledge of the main channel CSI is still needed,
which can also be unrealistic due to the presence of noise in the channel estimation.
In practice, CSI is typically obtained through training and channel estimation at the destination.
In conventional systems (without secrecy constraints), training signal designs have been studied
in the literature for both single-user [9], [10] and multiuser systems [11]. In these cases, training
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3is often done by having the source transmit a pilot signal to enable channel estimation at the
destination (and CSI at the source is obtained by having the destination feedback its channel
estimate to the source). However, this approach may not be favorable for systems with secrecy
considerations since the emission of pilot signals by the source also enables channel estimation
at the eavesdropper (and in this way enhances its ability to intercept the source’s message).
More recently, a secrecy enhancing training scheme, called the discriminatory channel estimation
(DCE) scheme, was proposed in [12], [13], where AN is super-imposed on top of the pilot signal
in the training phase to disrupt the channel estimation at the eavesdropper. These works showed
that DCE can indeed enhance the difference between the channel estimation qualities at the
destination and the eavesdropper in the training phase (before the actual data is transmitted), but
did not discuss its impact on the achievable secrecy rate in the data transmission phase.
The main objective of this work is to examine the impact of both conventional and DCE-type
training on the achievable secrecy rate of AN-assisted secrecy beamforming schemes. Different
from previous works in the literature that focus on either training or data transmission, we
consider the joint design and examine the role of AN in both of these phases. In this work,
the two-way DCE scheme proposed in [13] is employed in the training phase to prevent CSI
leakage to the eavesdropper, and the AN-assisted secrecy beamforming scheme is used in the
data transmission phase to mask the transmission of the confidential message. We first derive
bounds on the achievable secrecy rate of these schemes, which are shown to be asymptotically
tight as the transmit power increases, and utilize them to obtain closed-form approximations of
the achievable secrecy rate. Then, based on the approximate secrecy rate expressions, optimal
power allocation policies for the pilot signal, the data signal, and AN in both phases are obtained
for systems employing conventional and AN-assisted training schemes, respectively. We show
that the use of AN (in either training or data transmission) is often necessary to achieve a
significantly higher secrecy rate at high SNR, and that its use in training can be more efficient
than that in data transmission when the coherence time is long. However, in the low SNR regime,
the use of AN provides no advantage in either training or data transmission. In fact, allocating
resources for training can be strictly suboptimal in this regime since it is difficult to obtain useful
CSI when power is scarce. Numerical results are provided to verify our theoretical claims.
The joint design of training and data transmission have been investigated for conventional
MIMO point-to-point and multiuser scenarios (without secrecy constraints) in [14] and [15],
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4respectively. However, these issues have not been discussed before for physical layer secret
communications, where finding a reasonable approximation for the achievable secrecy rate under
channel estimation errors, and coping with the non-Gaussianity caused by the combination of AN
and channel estimation errors can be challenging. The impact of imperfect CSI due to channel
estimation errors and limited feedback on the achievable secrecy rate have been examined in
[16], [17] and [18], respectively. However, these works focus on the achievable secrecy rate for
given estimation error statistics without consideration on how training should be performed and
how it can impact the error statistics. Moreover, CSI at the eavesdropper is often assumed to be
perfect in these works to avoid the need to analyze the impact of channel estimation error at the
eavesdropper. A preliminary study of our work was presented in [19] for the case of conventional
training. The current work further considers the case of AN-assisted training, provides rigorous
proofs of the theoretical claims, and examines the low SNR case.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model and
the training-based transmission scheme are introduced. In Section III, upper and lower bounds
of the achievable secrecy rate under channel estimation error are obtained. In Sections IV and
V, closed-form secrecy rate expressions and optimal power allocation policies are derived for
cases with conventional and DCE training, respectively. The analysis of the secrecy rate with
training-based transmission scheme in the low SNR regime is discussed in Section VI. Finally,
numerical results are provided in Section VII, and a conclusion is given in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let us consider a wireless secret communication system that consists of a source, a destination,
and an eavesdropper. The source is assumed to have nt antennas whereas both the destination and
the eavesdropper are assumed to have only a single antenna each. The main and eavesdropper
channels (i.e., the channel from the source to the destination and to the eavesdropper, respectively)
can be described by the vectors h = [h1, . . . , hnt ]T and g = [g1, . . . , gnt]T , respectively, where
the entries are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian
random variables with mean 0 variances σ2h and σ2g , respectively (i.e., CN (0, σ2h) and CN (0, σ2g)).
We consider a block fading scenario where the channel vectors remain constant over a coherence
interval of duration T , but vary independently from block to block. By adopting a training-based
transmission scheme, each coherence interval is divided into a training phase with duration Tt
March 8, 2018 DRAFT
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Fig. 1. Training-based secret transmission scheme that consists of a training phase and a data transmission phase.
and a data transmission phase with duration Td, as illustrated in Fig. 1. In the training phase,
pilot signals are emitted by the source (and/or the destination) to enable channel estimation at the
destination; and, in the data transmission phase, confidential messages are transmitted utilizing
the estimated channel obtained in the previous phase. Following methods proposed in [12], [13]
for training and in [20] for data transmission, AN is utilized in the respective phases to degrade
the reception at the eavesdropper. Our goal is thus to determine the optimal resource allocation
between signal and AN, and examine the role of AN in these two phases.
A. Training Phase - AN-Assisted Training
In conventional point-to-point communication systems, training is typically performed by
having the source emit pilot signals to enable channel estimation at the destination. Most works
in the literature on physical layer secrecy, e.g., [4], [20]–[22], inherit such an assumption and,
thus, assume that the eavesdropper can also benefit from the pilot transmission and can obtain
a channel estimate that is no worse than the destination. Interestingly, it has been shown more
recently in [12], [13] that secrecy can be further enhanced by embedding AN in the pilot signal
to degrade the channel estimation performance at the eavesdropper. By doing so, the difference
between the effective channel qualities experienced by the destination and the eavesdropper can
be enhanced and, thus, a higher secrecy rate can be achieved. Here, we consider in particular
the two-way discriminatory channel estimation (DCE) scheme proposed in [13]. In the DCE
scheme, training is performed in two stages, i.e., the reverse and the forward training stages. In
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6the reverse training stage, a pure pilot signal is sent in the reverse direction by the destination to
enable channel estimation at the source; in the forward training stage, a pilot signal masked by
AN is emitted by the source to facilitate channel estimation at the destination while preventing
reliable channel estimation at the eavesdropper. Here, the channel is assumed to be reciprocal,
that is, the reverse channel can be represented as the transpose of the forward channel vector,
i.e., ht. Therefore, estimation of the reverse channel provides the source with information about
the forward channel. Note that DCE can also be used in non-reciprocal channels, as shown in
[13], but is not considered here for simplicity.
Let Tr and Tf be the length of the reverse and the forward training stages, respectively, where
Tr + Tf = Tt. In the reverse training stage, the pilot signal sr ∈ CTr×1 with s†rsr = Tr is first
emitted by the destination and the received signal at the source can be written as
Yr =
√
Pr srh
t +Vr (1)
where Pr is the power of the pilot signal in the reverse training stage, ht is the channel vector
from the destination to the source, and Vr ∈ CTr×nt is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
matrix with entries that are i.i.d. CN (0, σ2). Following the procedures given in [13], the source
first computes the minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimate of the channel based on the
knowledge of sr. The channel estimate at the source is denoted by h˜ and the channel estimation
error is ∆hr = h− h˜. The variance of each entry of ∆hr can be written as
σ2∆hr =
(
1
σ2h
+
PrTr
σ2
)−1
. (2)
Then, in the forward training stage, the source emits a training signal with AN placed in
the null space of the estimated forward channel, i.e., h˜. The signal transmitted in the forward
training stage is given by
Xf =
√
PfSf +AfNh˜, (3)
where Sf ∈ CTf×nt is the pilot signal in the forward training stage with S†fSf = Tfnt I, Pf is the
power of the pilot signal in the forward training stage, N
h˜
∈ C(nt−1)×nt is a matrix whose rows
span the null space of h˜ and satisfies N
h˜
N
†
h˜
= Int−1, and Af ∈ CTf×(nt−1) is the AN with
entries that are i.i.d. CN (0, Pfa
nt−1
). Hence, the total AN power in the forward training stage is
Pfa . The signals received at the destination and the eavesdropper can then be written respectively
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7as
yf = Xfh+ vf =
√
PfSfh+AfNh˜∆hr + vf , (4)
zf = Xfg +wf =
√
PfSfg +AfNh˜g +wf , (5)
where vf and wf are the AWGN with entries that are i.i.d. CN (0, σ2) at the destination and
the eavesdropper, respectively. The destination and the eavesdropper are then able to compute
MMSE estimates hˆ and gˆ of their respective channels. The channel estimation error vectors are
∆h , h− hˆ and ∆g , g − gˆ, whose entries are 0 mean with variances
σ2∆h =
(
1
σ2h
+
PfTf/nt
Pfaσ
2
∆hr
+ σ2
)−1
, (6)
and
σ2∆g =
(
1
σ2g
+
PfTf/nt
Pfaσ
2
g + σ
2
)−1
, (7)
respectively. The channel estimate hˆ is fed back to the source for use in data transmission.
It is interesting to remark that, in the DCE scheme described above, reverse training is first
performed to provide the source with knowledge of the channel between itself and the destination
(but does not help the eavesdropper obtain information about its channel from the source). This
knowledge is then used by the source to determine the AN placement in the forward training
stage so as to minimize its interference at the destination. In conventional training, only the
forward training stage is required since AN is not utilized. In this case, the training length is
Tt = Tf (since Tr = 0) and the forward training signal can be expressed simply as Xf =
√
PfSf .
Even though the time required for conventional training is less than that of DCE (leaving more
channel uses for data transmission in each coherence interval), the achievable secrecy rate may
not necessarily be higher due to increased CSI leakage [22] to the eavesdropper.
B. Data Transmission Phase - AN-Assisted Secrecy Beamforming
Suppose that the source is able to obtain knowledge of the channel estimate hˆ through feedback
from the destination but has only statistical knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel g (and also
gˆ). Based on this channel knowledge, the source can then utilize in the data transmission phase
an AN-assisted secrecy beamforming scheme [20] where the data-bearing signal is directed
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8towards the destination while AN is placed in the null space of hˆ to jam the reception at the
eavesdropper. The transmit signal is thus given by
Xd =
√
Pd sd
hˆ†
‖hˆ‖ +AdNhˆ (8)
where sd ∈ CTd×1 is the data-bearing signal vector whose entries are i.i.d. CN (0, 1), Pd is the
power of the data signal, N
hˆ
∈ C(nt−1)×nt is the matrix that spans the null space of hˆ and satisfies
NhˆN
†
hˆ
= Int−1, and Ad ∈ CTd×(nt−1) is the AN matrix whose entries are i.i.d. CN (0, Pant−1).
Hence, the total AN power in the data transmission phase is Pa.
The signals received at the destination and the eavesdropper are given by
yd = Xdhˆ+Xd∆h+ vd =
√
Pd sd‖hˆ‖+
√
Pd sd
hˆ†
‖hˆ‖∆h+AdNhˆ∆h+ vd, (9)
zd = Xdgˆ +Xd∆g +wd =
√
Pd sd
hˆ†
‖hˆ‖ gˆ +
√
Pd sd
hˆ†
‖hˆ‖∆g +AdNhˆg +wd, (10)
where vd ∼ CN (0, σ2I) and wd ∼ CN (0, σ2I) are the AWGN vectors. The signal and AN
powers in both training and data transmission should satisfy the total power constraint
(PrTr + PfTf + PfaTf + PdTd + PaTd)/T ≤ P. (11)
III. BOUNDS ON THE ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE WITH CHANNEL ESTIMATION ERROR
In this work, we are interested in studying the impact of AN in both training and data trans-
mission phases on the achievable secrecy rate of the scheme described in the previous section.
In particular, to communicate the confidential message from the source to the destination, we
consider a (2nTR, nT ) wiretap code that spans over the data transmission phases of n coherence
intervals. The code consists of an encoder φn that maps the message W ∈ W , {1, 2, ..., 2nTR}
to a length-n block codeword snd and a decoder ψn that maps the received signal ynd into the
message Wˆ ∈ W at the destination. A secrecy rate R is said to be achievable if there exists a
sequence of (2nTR, nT ) codes such that the average error probability at the destination goes to
zero, i.e., P (n)e , 12nTR
∑
w∈W Pr(Wˆ 6= w|W = w)→ 0, and the so-called equivocation rate [4],
[23] converges to the average entropy of W , i.e., R(n)e , 1nTH(W |znd , hˆn, gˆn)→ 1nTH(W ), as the
codeword length n→∞. Here, znd is the channel output at the eavesdropper over n coherence
intervals, and hˆn and gˆn are the estimated channel vectors at the destination and eavesdropper,
respectively, over the n coherence intervals. The equivocation rate provides a measure of the
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9information obtained by the eavesdropper and is computed here by conditioning on knowledge
of both channel estimates hˆn and gˆn at the eavesdropper (i.e., a worst case assumption).
Following the results in [2], an achievable secrecy rate of the proposed scheme with imperfect
CSI can be written as
R =
1
T
I(sd;yd, hˆ)− I(sd; zd, hˆ, gˆ) = 1
T
I(sd;yd|hˆ)− I(sd; zd|hˆ, gˆ), (12)
where the equality follows from the fact that sd is independent of hˆ and gˆ. Due to the presence of
channel estimation errors, it is difficult to express the achievable secrecy rate in a more explicit
form. However, we obtain, in the following theorem, upper and lower bounds that will later be
shown to be asymptotically tight at high SNR in the cases under consideration.
Theorem 1 Suppose that channel estimation errors ∆h and ∆g are Gaussian with i.i.d. en-
tries. Then, for nt sufficiently large, the achievable secrecy rate R of the AN-assisted secrecy
beamforming scheme in Section II-B can be bounded as
R˜−∆R(l) ≤ R ≤ R˜ +∆R(u) (13)
where
R˜ ,
Td
T
E
[
log
(
1 +
Pd(σ
2
h − σ2∆h)‖h‖2
Pdσ2∆h + Paσ
2
∆h + σ
2
)]
− Td
T
E
log
1 + Pd(σ2g − σ2∆g)g†hh†g‖h‖2
Pdσ2∆g + Pa(σ
2
g − σ2∆g)‖Nhˆg‖
2
nt−1
+ Paσ2∆g + σ
2
 , (14)
∆R(u) ,
1
T
log
(
(Pdσ
2
∆h + Paσ
2
∆h + σ
2)
Td
(Paσ2∆h + σ
2)
Td−1
)
− 1
T
E
[
log
(
Pd‖sd‖2σ2∆h + Paσ2∆h + σ2
)]
, (15)
and
∆R(l) ,
1
T
E
log

(
Pdσ
2
∆g + Pa(σ
2
g − σ2∆g)‖Nhˆg‖
2
nt−1
+ Paσ
2
∆g + σ
2
)Td
(
Pa(σ2g − σ2∆g)‖Nhˆg‖
2
nt−1
+ Paσ2∆g + σ
2
)Td−1


− 1
T
E
[
log
(
Pd‖sd‖2σ2∆g + Pa(σ2g − σ2∆g)
‖Nhˆg‖2
nt − 1 + Paσ
2
∆g + σ
2
)]
. (16)
In the above, h , hˆ/
√
σ2h − σ2∆h and g , gˆ/
√
σ2g − σ2∆g are the normalized channel estimates
whose entries are all i.i.d. CN (0, 1). Notice that h and g are normalized so that they are
independent of the power allocation, i.e., Pr, Pf , Pfa , Pd, and Pa.
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Details of the proof can be found in Appendix A. This theorem shows that the achievable
secrecy rate can be bounded around R˜ given in (14) when the aggregate of the channel estimation
error and the AN interference terms are effectively Gaussian. These bounds are analogous to
those derived in [14] and [24] for conventional point-to-point channels. However, the proof of our
theorem requires large nt analysis to cope with the non-Gaussianity of the additional noise term
caused by the combination of estimation error and AN. The bounds in Theorem 1 are applicable
regardless of the training scheme as long as ∆h and ∆g are Gaussian. In the following corollary,
we show that the bounds are in fact applicable for both the conventional and the AN-assisted
training schemes considered in our work.
Corollary 1 The bounds in Theorem 1 hold when either conventional or AN-assisted training
(i.e., DCE) schemes with linear MMSE estimation is adopted in the training phase.
The corollary can be shown as follows. In the conventional training scheme, no AN interference
exists in the received forward training signals in (4) and (5) and, thus, the estimation error ∆h
(and also ∆g) is indeed Gaussian and independent of hˆ when employing the linear MMSE
estimation (which is also the optimal MMSE estimation in this case) [25]. However, this is not the
case in AN-assisted training since the AN interference AfNh˜∆hr in (4) is non-Gaussian. Yet, by
applying Lemma 1 in Appendix A, we can also show that AfNh˜∆hr is asymptotically Gaussian
as nt → ∞ since ∆hr is again Gaussian as a result of the MMSE estimation at the source.
These bounds are utilized in Sections IV and V to derive the optimal power allocation between
pilot, data, and AN usage in cases with conventional and AN-assisted training, respectively.
IV. AN-ASSISTED SECRECY BEAMFORMING WITH CONVENTIONAL TRAINING IN THE
HIGH SNR REGIME
In this section, we first consider the case where AN is only applied in the data transmission
phase, but not in the training phase. We first derive an approximate secrecy rate expression based
on the bounds given in the previous section, and use it to determine the optimal power allocation
between the pilot signal in the training phase and the data and AN in the data transmission phase.
A. Asymptotic Approximation of the Achievable Secrecy Rate
In conventional training (i.e., in the case where AN is not utilized in the training phase), no
reverse training is needed and the forward training signal can be written as Xf =
√
PfSf . We
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assume that the training length is equal to the number of transmit antennas, i.e., Tt = Tf =
nt, which was shown to be optimal for conventional point-to-point systems without secrecy
constraints [14]. Without AN, the signals received at the destination and the eavesdropper in the
training phase can be written as
yf =
√
PfSfh+ vf , (17)
zf =
√
PfSfg +wf , (18)
By employing MMSE estimation at the destination, the channel estimation error variances in (6)
and (7) reduce to
σ2∆h =
σ2hσ
2
Pfσ
2
h + σ
2
(19)
and
σ2∆g =
σ2gσ
2
Pfσ2g + σ
2
, (20)
respectively. The signal model in the data transmission phase remains the same as in (8), (9), and
(10). Let us denote the achievable secrecy rate in this case (i.e., in the case with conventional
training) by Rconv. Then, by Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we know that
R˜conv −∆R(l)conv ≤ Rconv ≤ R˜conv +∆R(u)conv, (21)
where R˜conv, ∆R(l)conv, and ∆R(u)conv are given by (14), (15), and (16) with σ2∆h and σ2∆g substituted
by (19) and (20).
Let P∗(P ) , (P ∗f (P ), P ∗d (P ), P ∗a (P )) be the optimal power allocation (i.e., the power alloca-
tion that maximizes the achievable secrecy rate Rconv) under power constraint P . To derive the
optimal power allocation, it is often necessary to obtain an explicit expression of the achievable
secrecy rate, which is difficult to do in our case as remarked in the previous section. However,
we show in the following that the achievable secrecy rate under P∗(P ), i.e., Rconv(P∗(P )), can
be closely approximated by R˜conv(P∗(P )), for P sufficiently large. The dependence on P is
often neglected in the following for notational simplicity. To express the result, note that two
functions f and g are asymptotically equivalent (denoted by f .= g) if limx→∞ f(x)/g(x) = 1.
Theorem 2 The maximum achievable secrecy rate Rconv(P∗) under conventional training is
asymptotically equivalent to R˜conv(P∗) (i.e., Rconv(P∗) .= R˜conv(P∗)) as P →∞.
March 8, 2018 DRAFT
12
Moreover, we can show that, to achieve the maximum achievable secrecy rate, the powers
assigned to all components, including the pilot in the training phase and the signal and AN in
the data transmission phase, should scale at least linearly with P (i.e., should not vanish with
respect to P as P →∞). The result can be stated as follows.
Corollary 2 P ∗f (P ) = Ω(P ), P ∗d (P ) = Ω(P ), and P ∗a (P ) = Ω(P ), where f(x) = Ω(g(x))
denotes the fact that there exists k1 > 0 such that k1g(x) ≤ f(x) for all x sufficiently large [26].
The proofs of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 can be found in Appendix B. Notice that, due to the
total power constraint in (11), all power components are O(P ), where f(x) = O(g(x)) indicates
that there exists k2 > 0 such that f(x) ≤ k2g(x) for all x sufficiently large. That is, all power
components increase at most linearly with P . Hence, combined with Corollary 2, it follows that
the powers assigned to training, data, and AN should all scale exactly linearly with P . In this case,
the channel estimation error variances under P∗ can be written as σ2∆h = σ
2
h
σ2
P ∗
f
σ2
h
+σ2
= σ
2
P ∗
f
+ o
(
1
P
)
and σ2∆g =
σ2gσ
2
P ∗
f
σ2g+σ
2 =
σ2
P ∗
f
+ o
(
1
P
)
, where f(x) = o(g(x)) indicates that lim
x→∞
f(x)/g(x) = 0,
and, for P sufficiently large, the achievable secrecy rate can be approximated as
R˜conv(P∗)=Td
T
E
log
1 + P ∗d (σ2h + o(1))‖h‖2
(P ∗d + P
∗
a )
(
σ2
P ∗
f
+o
(
1
P
))
+σ2

− Td
T
E
log
1+ P ∗d (σ2g+o(1))g†hh†g‖h‖2
(P ∗d +P
∗
a )
(
σ2
P ∗
f
+o
(
1
P
))
+P ∗a (σ
2
g + o(1))
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
+σ2
 (22)
=
Td
T
E
log P ∗d σ2h‖h‖2(
P ∗
d
+P ∗a
P ∗
f
+ 1
)
σ2
− Td
T
E
log
1 + P ∗d g†hh†g‖h‖2
P ∗a
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
+ o(1). (23)
This follows from the fact that (P ∗d (P )+P ∗a (P ))/P ∗f (P ) = O(1) since P ∗d (P )+P ∗a (P ) = O(P )
by the total power constraint and P ∗f (P ) = Ω(P ) by Corollary 2.
Notice that the approximate secrecy rate given in (23) strictly increases with P ∗f , which implies
that one can always achieve a higher secrecy rate by increasing the power used for training. This is
because the increase of training power benefits the destination by reducing both the effective noise
due to channel estimation error and the AN interference; whereas only the channel estimation
error is reduced at the eavesdropper. Therefore, the total power constraint should be satisfied
with equality at the optimal point, i.e., P ∗f Tf + P ∗dTd + P ∗aTd = PT .
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In fact, for any ǫ > 0 and for nt sufficiently large, it can be further shown that
R˜conv ≥ Td
T
log
P ∗
d
P ∗a
P ∗a+P
∗
d(
P ∗
d
+P ∗a
P ∗
f
+ 1
)
σ2
+
Td
T
E
[
log
(
σ2h‖h‖2(1− ǫ)
)]
+
Td
T
ǫnt + o(1) (24)
The derivations can be found in Appendix C. This lower bound provides an explicit description
of the relation between the achievable secrecy rate and the power allocated to each component.
B. Joint Power Allocation between Training and Data Transmission
In this subsection, we propose a power allocation for the pilot signal, the data signal, and AN
with the goal of maximizing the achievable secrecy rate. However, instead of using the achievable
secrecy rate Rconv (whose expression is unknown) as the objective function, we propose a power
allocation policy based on the maximization of this lower bound. More specifically, let us first
set Pa = (PT − PfTf − PdTd)/Td since the total power constraint must be satisfied. Then, by
removing all the terms that are irrelevant to the optimization and by the fact that the logarithm
is a monotonically increasing function, we formulate the power allocation problem as follows:
max
Pf ,Pd
Pd(PT−PfTf−PdTd)
(PT−PfTf )
PT−PfTf
PfTd
+ 1
, Jconv(Pf , Pd) (25a)
subject to Pf > 0, Pd > 0 (25b)
PT − PfTf − PTd > 0. (25c)
Notice that the powers Pf , Pd, and Pa = (PT − PfTf −PdTd)/Td are constrained to be greater
than zero due to Corollary 2.
By taking the first-order derivative of Jconv and setting it to zero, we get the solution
(Pˆ ∗f , Pˆ
∗
d ) =
(
PT
√
Tf
Tf
(√
Tf +
√
Td
) , PT√Td
2Td
(√
Tf +
√
Td
)) . (26)
To verify that (Pˆ ∗f , Pˆ ∗d ) is indeed the optimal solution of (25), it remains to be shown that the
Hessian matrix at the point (Pˆ ∗f , Pˆ ∗d ), i.e.,
HJconv = ∇2Jconv(Pˆ ∗f , Pˆ ∗d ) =
 −T 2f+Tf√TfTd2PTTd − TfPT
− Tf
PT
−2Td
PT
 , (27)
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is negative semi-definite. Since HJconv is real and symmetric, this follows from the fact that all
principal minors of HJconv are positive i.e.,
(−1)1 det ([HJconv ]{1},{1}) = − det
(
−T
2
f + Tf
√
TfTd
2PTTd
)
> 0
(−1)2 det ([HJconv ]{1,2},{1,2}) = det (HJconv) = T 2f + Tf√TfTdP 2T 2 − T 2fP 2T 2 > 0
due to Sylvester’s criterion [27]. Hence, the proposed power allocation that maximizes the
approximate secrecy rate in (24) is given in the following theorem.
Proposition 1 The power allocation that maximizes the approximate secrecy rate in (24) is
(Pˆ ∗f , Pˆ
∗
d , Pˆ
∗
a ) =
(
PT
√
Tf
Tf
(√
Tf +
√
Td
) , PT√Td
2Td
(√
Tf +
√
Td
) , PT√Td
2Td
(√
Tf +
√
Td
)) . (28)
The effectiveness of this solution compared to the optimal power allocation P∗ (i.e., the one
that maximizes the achievable secrecy rate Rconv) will be verified numerically in Section VII.
This solution indicates that, with conventional training, the ratio between the energy used for
training and that for data transmission, i.e., Pˆ ∗f Tf/(Pˆ ∗dTd + Pˆ ∗aTd), should be equal to
√
Tf/Td.
Recall that Tf is equal to nt whereas Td increases with the coherence time. Hence, as the
coherence time increases, more and more energy should be allocated to the data transmission
phase to support the increasing number of channel uses. Moreover, we can also see from (28) that
equal power should be allocated to data and AN in the data transmission phase. It is interesting
to observe that the solution does not depend on the channel variances σ2h and σ2g since, for P
sufficiently large, the AWGN terms are negligible and, thus, the SNR at both the destination and
the eavesdropper are determined by the ratio between their own received data and AN powers,
which experience the same channel gains when arriving at their respective receivers.
Furthermore, by (23), we can observe that the achievable secrecy rate increases without bound
as P increases. However, this is not always the case when AN is not utilized in either training
or data transmission as to be shown in our simulations. This implies that AN is necessary (at
least in the data transmission phase) to achieve a secrecy rate that increases without bound
with respect to P . However, when the coherence time is large, the energy allocated to training
becomes negligible and almost half the total energy is allocated to AN in the data transmission
phase (according to (28)). That is, only half the energy is left to transmit the actual message.
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However, if AN is further applied in the training phase (as done in the DCE scheme [12], [13]),
the difference between the effective channel qualities at the destination and at the eavesdropper
can be enhanced, even before the data is actually transmitted. The proportion of AN needed in
the data transmission phase can then be reduced. This is discussed in the following section.
V. AN-ASSISTED SECRECY BEAMFORMING WITH DCE (I.E., AN-ASSISTED) TRAINING IN
THE HIGH SNR REGIME
In this section, we consider the case where AN is used in both the training and the data
transmission phases. This refers to the DCE and the AN-assisted secrecy beamforming schemes
described in Sections II-A and II-B, respectively. Similar to the previous section, we first derive
an approximate expression of the achievable secrecy rate and then propose an efficient algorithm
for determining the power allocation between pilot, data, and AN in both phases.
A. Asymptotic Approximation of the Achievable Secrecy Rate
Following Section II, let the length of the reverse and the forward training signals be equal
to the number of antennas at the destination and the source, respectively. That is, we set Tr = 1
and Tf = nt. To distinguish from Rconv in the previous section, we use RDCE to denote the
achievable secrecy rate of the system considered here. Similarly by Theorem 1, we can obtain
upper and lower bounds of RDCE as
R˜DCE −∆R(l)DCE ≤ RDCE ≤ R˜DCE +∆R(u)DCE, (29)
where the terms are given by (14), (15), and (16) with σ2∆h and σ2∆g equal to (6) and (7).
Let P∗ , (P ∗r , P ∗f , P ∗fa, P ∗d , P ∗a ) be the optimal power allocation that maximizes the achievable
secrecy rate RDCE. Similar to the case with conventional training, we can also show that
RDCE(P∗) can be closely approximated by R˜DCE(P∗), for P sufficiently large.
Theorem 3 The maximum achievable secrecy rate RDCE(P∗) under DCE training is asymptot-
ically equivalent to R˜DCE(P∗) (i.e., RDCE(P∗) .= R˜DCE(P∗)) as P →∞.
The scaling of the optimal power allocation can also be derived as follows.
Corollary 3 P ∗f (P ) = Ω(P ) and P ∗d (P ) = Ω(P ), and that either P ∗fa(P ) = Ω(P ) or P ∗a (P ) =
Ω(P ). Moreover, we have P ∗r (P ) = Ω(P ∗fa(P )).
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The proofs of the theorem and the corollary can both be found in Appendix D. The corollary
shows that, to achieve the maximum acheivable secrecy rate, the power allocated to the forward
pilot signal in the training phase and the message-bearing signal in the data transmission phase,
i.e., P ∗f (P ) and P ∗d (P ), should both increase linearly with P , and so should the power of at
least one of the AN terms (either in the training or data transmission phases, or both). Moreover,
the reverse training power P ∗r (P ) should scale at least as fast as the AN power P ∗fa(P ) in the
training phase. This is because, with larger AN power P ∗fa(P ), more power should be invested
in reverse training to ensure more accurate placement of AN in the forward training stage.
By Corollary 3, the channel estimation error variances in (6) and (7) can be written as
σ2∆h =
σ2h
(
P ∗fa
σ2
h
σ2
σ2+P ∗r σ
2
h
+ σ2
)
P ∗fa
σ2
h
σ2
σ2+P ∗r σ
2
h
+ σ2 + P ∗f σ
2
h
=
σ2
P ∗f
(
1 +
P ∗faσ
2
h
σ2 + P ∗r σ
2
h
)
(1 + o(1)) = o(1), (30)
since P ∗r (P ) = Ω(P ∗fa(P )) and P
∗
f (P ) = Ω(P ), and
σ2∆g =
P ∗faσ
4
g + σ
2σ2g
P ∗faσ
2
g + σ
2 + P ∗f σ
2
g
=
P ∗faσ
2
g + σ
2
P ∗fa + P
∗
f
(1 + o(1)), (31)
respectively. Notice that, in (31), the ratio P
∗
fa
σ2g+σ
2
P ∗
fa
+P ∗
f
is at least O(1), but may also be o(1) if P ∗fa
does not scale as fast as P ∗f . Then, for P sufficiently large, the achievable secrecy rate can be
approximated as
R˜DCE=
Td
T
E
log
1+ P ∗d (σ2h + o(1))‖h‖2
(P ∗d +P
∗
a )
σ2
P ∗
f
(
1+
P ∗
fa
σ2
h
σ2+P ∗r σ
2
h
)
(1 + o(1)) + σ2


−Td
T
E
log
1+ P ∗d
(
P ∗
f
σ2g
P ∗
fa
+P ∗
f
(1 + o(1))
)
g†hh
†
g
‖h‖2
(P ∗d +P
∗
a )
[
P ∗
fa
σ2g+σ
2
P ∗
fa
+P ∗
f
(1+o(1))
]
+P ∗a
[
P ∗
f
σ2g
P ∗
fa
+P ∗
f
(1+o(1))
]
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
+σ2

 (32)
=
Td
T
E
[
log
(
P ∗dP
∗
f (σ
2 + P ∗r σ
2
h)σ
2
h‖h‖2/σ2
(P ∗d + P
∗
a )
(
σ2 + P ∗r σ
2
h + P
∗
fa
σ2h
)
+ P ∗f (σ
2 + P ∗r σ
2
h)
)]
−Td
T
E
log
1+ P ∗dP ∗f σ2g g†hh†g‖h‖2
(P ∗d +P
∗
a )(P
∗
fa
σ2g+σ
2)+P ∗aP
∗
f σ
2
g
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
+σ2(P ∗fa+P
∗
f )
+o(1). (33)
Following the approach used to obtain (24) (c.f. Appendix C), we can show that, for any
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ǫ′ > 0 and for nt sufficiently large, the second term in (33) can be approximated as
Td
T
E
log
1 + P ∗dP ∗f σ2g g†hh†g‖h‖2
(P ∗d + P
∗
a )(P
∗
fa
σ2g + σ
2) + P ∗aP
∗
f σ
2
g(1− ǫ′) + σ2(P ∗fa + P ∗f )
+ Td
T
ǫ′nt
=
Td
T
E
log
1 + P ∗dP ∗f σ2g g†hh†g‖h‖2
(P ∗d + P
∗
a )(P
∗
fa
σ2g + σ
2) + P ∗aP
∗
f σ
2
g(1− ǫ′)
+ Td
T
ǫ′nt + o(1) (34)
where ǫ′nt , E
[
log
(
1+
P ∗
d
P ∗
f
σ2gg
†hh
†
g/||h||2
(P ∗
d
+P ∗a )(P
∗
fa
σ2g+σ
2)+P ∗aP
∗
f
σ2g‖Nhˆg‖
2/(nt−1)+σ2(P ∗fa+P
∗
f
)
) ∣∣∣∣Acǫ′]Pr(Acǫ′) → 0 as
nt → ∞ and Acǫ′ , {|‖Nhˆg‖2/(nt − 1)− 1| > ǫ′}. The equality holds since, by Corollary
3, either P ∗fa(P ) = Ω(P ) or P
∗
a (P ) = Ω(P ). Then, by further applying Jensen’s inequality to
(34), we obtain from (33) the following lower bound on R˜DCE:
R˜DCE ≥Td
T
log
(
P ∗dP
∗
f (σ
2 + P ∗r σ
2
h)
(P ∗d +P
∗
a )
(
σ2+P ∗r σ
2
h+P
∗
fa
σ2h
)
+P ∗f (σ
2+P ∗r σ
2
h)
)
+
Td
T
E
[
log
σ2h‖h‖2
σ2
]
− Td
T
log
(
1 +
P ∗dP
∗
f σ
2
g
(P ∗d +P
∗
a )(P
∗
fa
σ2g + σ
2)+P ∗aP
∗
f σ
2
g(1− ǫ′)
)
+
Td
T
ǫ′nt+o(1) (35)
It is worthwhile to note that, in this case, the length of the data transmission phase is Td =
T − Tr − Tf , which is different from that in the conventional case.
B. Joint Power Allocation between Training and Data Transmission
Similar to the case with conventional training, we determine the optimal power allocation by
maximizing the lower bound in (35). By the fact that the logarithm is a monotonically increasing
function and by removing all the terms that are irrelevant to the optimization, we formulate the
power allocation problem as follows:
max
Pr,Pf ,Pfa ,Pd,Pa
PdPf (σ
2 + Prσ
2
h)
(Pd+Pa) (σ2+Prσ
2
h+Pfaσ
2
h)+Pf(σ
2+Prσ
2
h)
× (Pd+Pa)(Pfaσ
2
g+σ
2)+PaPfσ
2
g(1−ǫ′)
(Pd+Pa)(Pfaσ
2
g+σ
2)+PaPfσ2g(1−ǫ′)+PdPfσ2g
, JDCE(Pr,Pf ,Pfa ,Pd,Pa) (36a)
subject to Pr > 0, Pf > 0, Pfa > 0, Pd > 0, Pa > 0, (36b)
PrTr + PfTf + PfaTf + PdTd + PaTd = PT. (36c)
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Notice that the approximate secrecy rate expression in (35) follows from Corollary 3 where
it was shown that at least one of the two AN powers (either P ∗fa(P ) or P ∗a (P ), or both) scale
linearly with P . However, by the proof of Theorem 3 in Appendix D, we know that the same
asymptotic secrecy rate can also be achieved by having all power components Pr, Pf , Pfa , Pd,
and Pa scale linearly with P . In this case, the objective function can be further approximated as
J˜DCE(Pr,Pf ,Pfa ,Pd,Pa)=
PrPfPd
(Pd+Pa)(Pfa+Pr)+PrPf
· (Pd+Pa)Pfa+PaPf(1−ǫ
′)
(Pd+Pa)Pfa+PaPf (1−ǫ′)+PdPf
. (37)
Moreover, in (36), the total power constraint is replaced with an equality in (36c) since the
objective function increases monotonically with respect to Pr (regardless of whether JDCE or
J˜DCE is considered). This is because the increase of reverse training power does not benefit
the eavesdropper and can be set as large as possible. However, this problem is nonconvex and,
thus, is difficult to solve efficiently. To obtain an efficient solution for this problem, we take a
successive convex approximation (SCA) approach where we turn the problem into a sequence of
geometric programming (GP) problems using the monomial approximation and the condensation
method, similar to that done in [28] and [12]. In the following, we describe the procedures of
the SCA algorithm briefly using J˜DCE as the objective function. The same can be done with
JDCE as well. Further details can be found in [28] and [12].
For convenience, let us consider equivalently the minimization of the inverse of the objective
function, i.e.,
J˜−1DCE(Pr,Pf ,Pfa ,Pd,Pa)=
[(Pd+Pa)(Pfa+Pr)+PrPf ][(Pd+Pa)Pfa+PaPf(1−ǫ′)+PdPf ]
PrPfPd[(Pd+Pa)Pfa+PaPf(1−ǫ′)]
. (38)
Notice that the denominator of J˜−1DCE is a posynomial function that can be lower-bounded as
PrPfPd[(Pd+Pa)Pfa+PaPf(1−ǫ′)] ≥ PrPfPd
(
PdPfa
ξ1
)ξ1 (PaPfa
ξ2
)ξ2 ((1− ǫ′)PaPf
ξ3
)ξ3
(39)
for any ξ1, ξ2, ξ3 ≥ 0, where the right-hand-side is a monomial function. By substituting the
term with its monomial lower bound, we obtain a standard GP problem that is solvable in
polynomial time. In the SCA algorithm, this is done iteratively until the solution converges.
In particular, suppose that (P (i−1)r , P (i−1)f , P
(i−1)
fa
, P
(i−1)
d , P
(i−1)
a ) is the solution obtained in the
(i − 1)-th iteration. Then, in the i-th iteration, the denominator of J−1DCE is replaced by the
monomial function
PrPfPd
(
PdPfa
ξ
(i)
1
)ξ(i)1 (
PaPfa
ξ
(i)
2
)ξ(i)2 (
(1− ǫ′)PaPf
ξ
(i)
3
)ξ(i)3
, (40)
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where ξ(i)0 = P
(i−1)
d P
(i−1)
fa
+ P
(i−1)
a P
(i−1)
fa
+ (1− ǫ′)P (i−1)a P (i−1)f , ξ(i)1 = P (i−1)d P (i−1)fa /ξ(i)0 , ξ(i)2 =
P
(i−1)
a P
(i−1)
fa
/ξ
(i)
0 , and ξ
(i)
3 = (1 − ǫ′)P (i−1)a P (i−1)f /ξ(i)0 . The algorithm is guaranteed to converge
to a stationary point of the problem [28]. The procedures are summarized in Algorithm 1 and
the resulting solution is denoted by Pˆ∗ = (Pˆ ∗r , Pˆ ∗f , Pˆ ∗fa, Pˆ ∗d , Pˆ ∗a ).
Algorithm 1 Power Allocation for AN-Assisted Training and Data Transmission
1: Initialize: Give an initial set of feasible values
(
P
(0)
r , P
(0)
f , P
(0)
fa
, P
(0)
d , P
(0)
a
)
and a conver-
gence threshold ǫ0 > 0. Set iteration number i := 0.
2: repeat
3: i := i+ 1;
4: Set ξ(i)0 = P
(i−1)
d P
(i−1)
fa
+ P
(i−1)
a P
(i−1)
fa
+ (1 − ǫ′)P (i−1)a P (i−1)f , ξ(i)1 = P (i−1)d P (i−1)fa /ξ(i)0 ,
ξ
(i)
2 = P
(i−1)
a P
(i−1)
fa
/ξ
(i)
0 , and ξ
(i)
3 = (1− ǫ′)P (i−1)a P (i−1)f /ξ(i)0 .
5: Find
(
P
(i)
r , P
(i)
f , P
(i)
fa
, P
(i)
d , P
(i)
a
)
by solving the GP problem
min
Pr,Pf ,Pfa ,Pd,Pa
[(Pd+Pa)(Pfa+Pr)+PrPf ][(Pd+Pa)Pfa+PaPf(1−ǫ′)+PdPf ]
PrPfPd(PdPfa/ξ
(i)
1 )
ξ
(i)
1 (PaPfa/ξ
(i)
2 )
ξ
(i)
2 [(1− ǫ′)PaPf/ξ(i)3 ]ξ
(i)
3
subject to Pr > 0, Pf > 0, Pfa > 0, Pd > 0, Pa > 0,
PrTr + PfTf + PfaTf + PdTd + PaTd = PT.
6: until
J−1DCE
(
P
(i)
r ,P
(i)
f
,P
(i)
fa
,P
(i)
d
,P
(i)
a
)
−J−1DCE
(
P
(i−1)
r ,P
(i−1)
f
,P
(i−1)
fa
,P
(i−1)
d
,P
(i−1)
a
)
J−1DCE
(
P
(i−1)
r ,P
(i−1)
f
,P
(i−1)
fa
,P
(i−1)
d
,P
(i−1)
a
) < ǫ0.
7: Output (Pˆ ∗r , Pˆ ∗f , Pˆ ∗fa, Pˆ ∗d , Pˆ ∗a ) =
(
P
(i)
r , P
(i)
f , P
(i)
fa
, P
(i)
d , P
(i)
a
)
.
C. Comparison with the Conventional Training Case
It is worthwhile to remark that, compared to the conventional training scheme in the previous
section, the DCE scheme requires an additional symbol period in the training phase for reverse
training. This results in a smaller pre-log factor and, thus, a significant loss in secrecy rate at high
SNR. However, in the following corollary, we show that the DCE scheme can always achieve a
higher secrecy rate as long as the coherence time is sufficiently long.
Corollary 4 Let Pˆ∗conv be the solution given in (28). Then, for P and nt sufficiently large, there
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exists P = (Pr, Pfa, Pf , Pd, Pa) such that R˜DCE(P) > R˜conv(Pˆ∗conv) if
T ≥ max
{
(4nt + 10)
2
nt
, 22 log10
(
Pσ2hnt
4σ2
)
+ 1
}
+ nt. (41)
The proof can be found in Appendix E. Corollary 4 implies that the DCE scheme can
outperform conventional training when T is sufficiently large, even though an additional channel
use is occupied by reverse training. This is because, with DCE training, the effective channel
qualities at the destination and the eavesdropper are already well-discriminated in the training
phase and thus a larger portion of energy can be allocated to data rather than AN in the data
transmission. Therefore, the achievable secrecy rate of the DCE scheme increases faster than that
of conventional training as the coherence time increases. Note that Corollary 4 provides only a
sufficient condition on the coherence time T . The advantage of DCE can actually be observed
for much smaller values of T as shown in our simulations.
VI. SECRECY RATE IN THE LOW SNR REGIME
In this section, we examine the achievable secrecy rate and the corresponding optimal power
allocation in the low SNR regime, i.e., in the case where σ2 →∞.
Let ur(hˆ) ,
√
Pdsd‖hˆ‖+
√
Pdsd
hˆ†
‖hˆ‖
∆h+AdNhˆ∆h be the summation of all terms other than
the AWGN in yd of (9). Then, we have
I(sd;yd|hˆ) =
∫
hˆ
f(hˆ)I(sd;yd|hˆ = hˆ)dhˆ (42)
=
∫
hˆ
f(hˆ)I(sd;ur(hˆ) + vd)dhˆ (43)
=
∫
hˆ
f(hˆ)
[
log e
σ2
G(sd,ur(hˆ)) +
log e
2σ4
∆(sd,ur(hˆ)) + o(σ
−4)
]
dhˆ, (44)
where G(x,y) , E [‖E[y|x]− E[y]‖2] and ∆(x;y) , tr{E [cov2(y|x)]−cov2(y)}. The equality
in (44) follows from the asymptotic expression of the mutual information given in [29, Theorem
1]. By direct calculation of G(sd,ur(hˆ)) and ∆(sd,ur(hˆ)), and by taking the expectation over
hˆ, it can be shown that
I(sd;yd|hˆ) = log e
σ4
(
PdTdPfTfσ
4
h + P
2
d σ
4
∆hT
2
d /2
)
+ o(σ−4). (45)
Similarly, we have
I(sd; zd|hˆ, g) = log e
σ4
(
PdTdPfTfσ
4
g/nt + P
2
d σ
4
∆gT
2
d /2
)
+ o(σ−4). (46)
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Notice that the first term in (45) is larger than that in (46) by a factor of nt due to the processing
gain provided by transmit beamforming. By combining the above, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4 In the low SNR regime, the achievable secrecy rate of the training-based transmis-
sion schemes is
Rs =
log e
Tσ4
(
PdTdPfTf (σ
4
h − σ4g/nt) + P 2dT 2d (σ4∆h − σ4∆g)/2
)
+ o(σ−4). (47)
Notice that the above secrecy rate does not depend on the AN power Pa in the data transmission
phase, and that σ2∆h → σ2h and σ2∆g → σ2g as σ2 → ∞ regardless of the AN power Pfa in the
training phase. Hence, the same asymptotic secrecy rate can be achieved even without the use
of AN and, thus, all power can be allocated to the transmission of either the pilot or the data
signals. However, it should be noted that the secrecy rate in (47) decays as 1/σ4 which is much
worse than that achievable when the noncoherent transmission scheme, previously proposed
in [30] for conventional point-to-point channels (without secrecy constraints), is employed. In
fact, by directly applying the transmission scheme in [30] to the wiretap channel model under
consideration, we can achieve a secrecy rate that decays only as 1/σ2. This is because the secrecy
beamforming and AN-assisted training and data transmission schemes considered in this paper
all rely on accurate channel knowledge, which is difficult to obtain at low SNR, whereas the
noncoherent transmission scheme in [30] does not. This shows that one can actually do better
without training in the low SNR regime.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we verify numerically our theoretical claims and compare the achievable
secrecy rates of different training and power allocation schemes. Unless mentioned otherwise,
the number of antennas at the source is nt = 16, the coherence interval is T = 480, the forward
training length is Tf = 16, and the reverse training length is Tr = 1 (when considering the DCE
scheme). The transmit SNR is defined as P/σ2 and the channel variances are σ2h = σ2g = 0.5.
In Fig. 2, we show the approximate achievable secrecy rate R˜conv(Pˆ∗conv) of the conven-
tional training case with Pˆ∗conv being the proposed power allocation given in (28) (labeled
as “R˜conv (Proposed)”) and compare it with the maximum value max
P
R˜conv(P) obtained via
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Fig. 2. The achievable secrecy rate R˜conv with different power allocations versus SNR.
exhaustive search (i.e., “R˜conv (Exhaustive)”). We can see that the approximate solution given in
(28) is indeed near optimal at high SNR and yields about 4 dB improvement over the case with
equal power allocation among all components (i.e., “R˜conv (Equal)”). Moreover, by comparing
R˜conv(Pˆ∗conv) with the optimized upper and lower bounds max
P
{R˜conv(P) + ∆R(u)conv(P)} and
max
P
{R˜conv(P) −∆R(l)conv(P)}, respectively, (i.e., “R˜conv + ∆R(u)conv (Exhaustive)” and “R˜conv −
∆R
(l)
conv (Exhaustive)”), we can also see that the approximate secrecy rate expression R˜conv(Pˆ∗conv)
indeed closely approximates the maximum achievable secrecy rate Rconv(P∗conv) (i.e., Theorem 2),
where P∗conv is the power allocation that maximizes Rconv, since max
P
{R˜conv(P)−∆R(l)conv(P)} ≤
Rconv(P∗conv) ≤ max
P
{R˜conv(P)+∆R(u)conv(P)} and R˜conv(Pˆ∗conv) ≈ max
P
{R˜conv(P)−∆R(l)conv(P)} ≈
max
P
{R˜conv(P) + ∆R(u)conv(P)} at high SNR, as shown in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 3, we show the approximate achievable secrecy rate R˜DCE(Pˆ∗DCE) of the DCE training
case with Pˆ∗DCE being the proposed solution obtained by Algorithm 1 (i.e. “R˜DCE (Proposed)”)
and compare it with the maximum value max
P
R˜DCE(P) obtained via exhaustive search (i.e.,
“R˜DCE (Exhaustive)”). Again, the secrecy rate obtained with the proposed solution rapidly
converges towards the maximum value obtained via exhaustive search as the transmit SNR
increases. A 7 dB improvement is also observed when compared to the case with equal power
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Fig. 3. The achievable secrecy rate R˜DCE with different power allocations versus SNR.
allocation. Moreover, since the optimized upper and lower bounds max
P
{R˜DCE(P)+∆R(u)DCE(P)}
and max
P
{R˜DCE(P)−∆R(l)DCE(P)} maintains a constant difference as the transmit SNR increases
and, by Fig. 3, R˜DCE(Pˆ∗DCE) maintains between the two bounds, it follows that the difference
between the approximate and the actual rates, i.e., R˜DCE(Pˆ∗DCE)−RDCE(P∗DCE), where P∗DCE is
the power allocation that maximizes RDCE, becomes negligible compared to RDCE(P∗DCE).
In Fig. 4, we compare the (approximate) achievable secrecy rate of different transmission
schemes, namely, the case with conventional training (i.e., the case where AN is utilized only in
the data transmission phase), the case with DCE training, and the case where no AN is used in
either training or data transmission. Recall that Td = T −Tf −Tr where Tr = 1 in the case with
DCE training and is 0 otherwise. We can observe that DCE training yields the best performance
even though an additional channel use is required for reverse training. Moreover, we can see
that, when AN is not used in either training and data transmission, the achievable secrecy rate
becomes bounded as the transmit SNR increases, regardless of whether we are looking at R˜noAN
or the upper bound R˜noAN + ∆R(u)noAN. This indicates that the use of AN is critical to achieve
good secrecy rate performance in the high SNR regime.
In Fig. 5, we verify the effect of coherence time on the achievable secrecy rate of the different
schemes. Here, the transmit SNR is fixed at 30 dB. The DCE scheme with suboptimal power
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allocation refers to the power allocation used to prove the sufficient condition in Corollary 4. The
suboptimal solution performs significantly worse than the proposed solution, but was sufficient
to yield the condition in Corollary 4. In fact, with the proposed power allocation, DCE is able
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to outperform conventional training with a coherence time of only 70, which is considerably
smaller than the value 250 required by the suboptimal power allocation. Yet, the latter is still
smaller than the value 358.25 predicted by Corollary 4, where the result is more conservative.
Moreover, by comparing between “R˜DCE (Proposed)” and “R˜conv (Proposed)”, we can also see
that the advantage of utilizing AN in the training phase increases as the coherence time increases.
This is because, by applying AN in the training phase, we can allocate less energy to AN in the
data transmission phase and, thus, more energy to the actual message-bearing signal.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examined the impact of both conventional and AN-assisted training on
the achievable secrecy rate of the AN-assisted secrecy beamforming scheme. Bounds on the
achievable secrecy rate were first derived and then utilized to obtain a closed-form approximation
that is shown to be asymptotically tight at high SNR. The approximate expression was then
adopted as the objective function to determine the power allocation between pilot signals, data
signals, and AN in both training and data transmission phases. An asymptotically optimal closed-
form solution was obtained for the case with conventional training whereas a successive convex
approximation approach was proposed for the case with DCE training. Furthermore, in the low
SNR regime, we showed that AN provides no gains in secrecy rate and, thus, is not needed in
either training or data transmission. Numerical simulations were provided to verify the tightness
of the bounds and the advantages of DCE over conventional training.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Here, we first derive upper and lower bounds of I(sd;yd|hˆ) and I(sd; zd|hˆ, gˆ), and apply
them directly to obtain the desired bounds for R, which is the difference of the two quantities.
The derivations of the upper and lower bounds are shown only for I(sd;yd|hˆ) whereas that of
I(sd; zd|hˆ, gˆ) can be obtained similarly.
A. Lower Bound of I(sd;yd|hˆ)
To derive the lower bound of I(sd;yd|hˆ), let us write
I(sd;yd|hˆ) = h(sd|hˆ)− h(sd|yd, hˆ), (48)
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where h(sd|hˆ) = h(sd) = Td log(πe) and h(sd|yd, hˆ) ≤ Ehˆ,yd
[
log
(
(πe)Td
∣∣∣Csd|yd,hˆ∣∣∣)] since
Gaussian maximizes entropy. Here, Ca|b represents the covariance matrix of a given b, and
|A| represents the determinant of A. Moreover, for any estimate sˆd of sd given yd and hˆ,
we have Csd|yd,hˆ 4 Esd|yd,hˆ
[
(sd − sˆd)(sd − sˆd)†
]
, where A 4 B denotes that A − B is semi-
negative definite, and thus
∣∣∣Csd|yd,hˆ∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣Esd|yd,hˆ [(sd − sˆd)(sd − sˆd)†]∣∣∣. Therefore, for sˆLd =
C
sdyd|hˆ
C−1
yd|hˆ
yd (i.e., the LMMSE of sd given yd while assuming that hˆ is known), we have
Ehˆ,yd
[
log
(
(πe)Td
∣∣∣Csd|yd,hˆ∣∣∣)]
≤ E
hˆ
[
E
yd|hˆ
[
log
(
(πe)Td
∣∣∣Esd|yd,hˆ [(sd − sˆLd )(sd − sˆLd )†]∣∣∣)]] (49)
≤ Ehˆ
[
log
(
(πe)Td
∣∣∣Csd|hˆ −Csdyd|hˆC−1yd|hˆCydsd|hˆ∣∣∣)] (50)
= Ehˆ
[
log
(
(πe)Td
∣∣∣∣∣ITd − Pd‖hˆ‖2Pd‖hˆ‖2 + Pdσ2∆h + Paσ2∆h + σ2 ITd
∣∣∣∣∣
)]
, (51)
where the last inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. Hence, by combining (48) and (51),
we have
I(sd;yd|hˆ) ≥ TdEhˆ
[
log
(
1 +
Pd‖hˆ‖2
Pdσ2∆h + Paσ
2
∆h + σ
2
)]
. (52)
B. Upper Bound of I(sd;yd|hˆ)
To obtain the upper bound, we instead write
I(sd;yd|hˆ) = h(yd|hˆ)− h(yd|sd, hˆ) (53)
where h(yd|hˆ) ≤ Ehˆ
[
log
(
(πe)Td
∣∣∣Cyd|hˆ∣∣∣)] since Gaussian maximizes entropy and h(yd|sd, hˆ) =
h(
√
Pd sd
hˆ†
‖hˆ‖
∆h +AdNhˆ∆h+ vd|sd, hˆ) by (9). Notice that h(yd|sd, hˆ) is difficult to evaluate
since AdNhˆ∆h is non-Gaussian. Hence, we resort to the following large nt analysis.
Lemma 1 Let A be a t×(n−1) matrix with entries being i.i.d. CN (0, P
n−1
)
, N be a (n−1)×n
semi-unitary matrix such that NN† = I, and ∆h be an n × 1 vector with entries being i.i.d.
CN (0, σ2∆h). Then, AN∆h converges in distribution to a Gaussian vector with entries being
i.i.d. CN (0, Pσ2∆h) as n→∞.
Proof: Let {N}i,j denote the (i, j)-th entry of matrix N and let ∆hj denote the j-entry of
vector ∆h. Then, we can define the vector b , N∆h whose i-th entry can be written as bi =
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∑
j{N}i,j∆hj . Note that b is a Gaussian vector with entries that are i.i.d. with mean 0 and vari-
ance σ2∆h since, regardless of the value of N, E[bib∗k|N] =
∑
j
∑
ℓ{N}i,j{N}∗k,ℓE [∆hj∆h∗ℓ ] =
σ2∆h, for i = k, and 0, otherwise. Then, it follows by central limit theorem that the i-th entry of
vectorAN∆h = Ab, i.e.,
∑
j{A}i,jbj = 1√(n−1)
∑
j{A}i,jbj where {A}i,j ,
√
n− 1{A}i,j ∼
CN (0, P ), converges in distribution to a Gaussian random variable with mean 0 and variance
Pσ2∆h, as n→∞. Moreover, since
∑
j
∑
ℓ E[{A}i,jbj{A}k,ℓbℓ] = 0 for i 6= k (i.e., the entries
of Ab are uncorrelated), it follows that Ab converges in distribution to a Gaussian vector with
entries that are i.i.d. CN (0, Pσ2∆h), as n→∞.
By Lemma 1 (with n = nt, t = Td, and P = Pa), we know that AdNhˆ∆h is asymptotically
Gaussian as nt →∞ if ∆h is Gaussian as well. Hence, for nt sufficiently large, we have
I(sd;yd|hˆ) ≤ Ehˆ
[
log
(
(πe)Td
∣∣∣Cyd|hˆ∣∣∣)]− Ehˆ [log ((πe)Td ∣∣∣Cyd|sd,hˆ∣∣∣)] (54)
= Ehˆ
log
∣∣∣(Pd‖hˆ‖2+Pdσ2∆h+Paσ2∆h+σ2) ITd∣∣∣∣∣∣Pdσ2∆hsds†d+(Paσ2∆h+σ2)ITd∣∣∣
 (55)
= Ehˆ
log
(
Pd‖hˆ‖2+Pdσ2∆h+Paσ2∆h+σ2
)Td
(Pdσ
2
∆h+Paσ
2
∆h +σ
2)Td
(Pdσ2∆h+Paσ
2
∆h +σ
2)Td
(
(Paσ2∆h+σ
2)
Td
∣∣∣Pdσ2∆hsds†dPaσ2∆h+σ2 +ITd∣∣∣)
 (56)
= TdEhˆ
[
log
(
1 +
Pd‖hˆ‖2
Pdσ2∆h + Paσ
2
∆h + σ
2
)]
+ T∆R(u). (57)
Similarly, it also holds, for ∆g Gaussian and nt sufficiently large, that
TdE
log
1 + Pd gˆ†hˆhˆ†gˆ‖hˆ‖2
Pdσ2∆g + Pa
‖N
hˆ
gˆ‖2
nt−1
+ Paσ2∆g + σ
2
 ≤ I(sd; zd|hˆ, gˆ)
≤ TdE
log
1 + Pd gˆ†hˆhˆ†gˆ‖hˆ‖2
Pdσ2∆g + Pa
‖N
hˆ
gˆ‖2
nt−1
+ Paσ2∆g + σ
2
+ T∆R(l) (58)
By combining the above bounds for I(sd;yd|hˆ) and I(sd; zd|hˆ, gˆ), we obtain the bounds of the
achievable secrecy rate in Theorem 1.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2 AND COROLLARY 2
A. Proof of Theorem 2
Let us consider the linear power allocation Pl , (Pf,l, Pd,l, Pa,l) = (αfP, βdP, βaP ) for some
positive constants αf , βd, and βa such that αfPTf + βdPTd+βaPTd ≤ PT . Then, by Theorem
1, it follows that
R˜conv(Pl)−∆R(l)conv(Pl)≤Rconv(P∗)≤R˜conv(P∗)+∆R(u)conv(P∗). (59)
Hence, to obtain Theorem 2, it is sufficient to show that R˜conv(Pl)−∆R(l)conv(Pl) .= R˜conv(P∗)+
∆R
(u)
conv(P∗), i.e., Rconv(P∗) .= R˜conv(P∗) +∆R(u)conv(P∗), and lim
P→∞
∆R
(u)
conv(P∗)/Rconv(P∗) = 0.
Specifically, by substituting Pl into (19) and (20), we can express the channel estimation
error variances as σ2∆h =
σ2
h
σ2
αfPσ
2
h
+σ2
= σ
2
αfP
+ o
(
1
P
)
and σ2∆g =
σ2gσ
2
αfPσ2g+σ
2 =
σ2
αfP
+ o
(
1
P
)
. Then,
it follows that
R˜conv(Pl)=Td
T
E
log
1 + βdP (σ2h + o(1))‖h‖2
(βd + βa)P
(
σ2
αfP
+o
(
1
P
))
+σ2


− Td
T
E
log
1+ βdP (σ2g+o(1))g†hh†g‖h‖2
(βd+βa)P
(
σ2
αfP
+o
(
1
P
))
+βaP (σ2g + o(1))
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
+σ2
 (60)
=
Td
T
E
log βdPσ2h‖h‖2+o(P )
σ2(βd+βa)
αf
+σ2+o(1)
−Td
T
E
log
1+ βdPσ2g g†hh†g‖h‖2 +o(P )
βaPσ2g
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
+o(P )
 (61)
=
Td
T
E
log βdPσ2h‖h‖2(
βd+βa
αf
+ 1
)
σ2
− Td
T
E
log
1 + βd g†hh†g‖h‖2
βa
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
+ o(1) (62)
=
Td
T
logP + c1 + o(1), (63)
where
c1 ,
Td
T
E
log βdσ2h‖h‖2(
βd+βa
αf
+ 1
)
σ2
− Td
T
E
log
1 + βd g†hh†g‖h‖2
βa
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
 (64)
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is a finite constant that is independent of P , and
∆R(l)conv(Pl)
=
1
T
E
log
[
(βd+βa)P
(
σ2
αfP
+o
(
1
P
))
+βaP
(
σ2g+o(1)
) ‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
+σ2
]Td
[
βaP
(
σ2g+o(1)
) ‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
+βaP
(
σ2
αfP
+o
(
1
P
))
+σ2
]Td−1

− 1
T
E
{
log
[
(βd‖sd‖2+βa)P
(
σ2
αfP
+o
(
1
P
))
+βaP
(
σ2g+o(1)
)‖Nhˆg‖2
nt−1 +σ
2
]}
(65)
=
1
T
E
log
(
βaPσ
2
g
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
+o(P )
)Td
(
βaPσ2g
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
+o(P )
)Td−1
− 1
T
E
[
log
(
βaPσ
2
g
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1 +o(P )
)]
= o(1). (66)
Hence,
R˜conv(Pl)−∆R(l)conv(Pl) =
Td
T
logP + c1 + o(1). (67)
Moreover, by (14) and (15), we can write
R˜conv(P∗) + ∆R(u)conv(P∗)
(a)
≤ Td
T
E
[
log
(
1+
P ∗d (σ
2
h−σ2∆h)‖h‖2
P ∗d σ
2
∆h+P
∗
aσ
2
∆h+σ
2
)]
+
1
T
log
(
P ∗d σ
2
∆h + P
∗
aσ
2
∆h + σ
2
)Td− 1
T
E
[
log
(
P ∗d ‖sd‖2σ2∆h
)] (68)
(b)
≤ Td
T
E
[
log
(
k′P
(
2σ2∆h+1+(σ
2
h−σ2∆h)‖h‖2
))]− 1
T
E
[
log
(
P ∗d ‖sd‖2σ2∆h
)] (69)
=
Td
T
logP − 1
T
log
(
P ∗d σ
2
∆h
)
+ c2, (70)
where c2 , (1/T )E
[
log
((
k′
(
2σ2∆h+1+(σ
2
h−σ2∆h)‖h‖2
))Td
/‖sd‖2
)]
is a finite constant. The
inequality in (a) follows by eliminating the negative term of R˜conv(P∗) in (14) and by eliminating
some positive parts in the denominator of the first term as well as in the second term of ∆R(u)conv
in (15); and (b) is obtained by upper-bounding Pd, Pa, and σ2 by k′P , where k′ is chosen such
that k′P ≥ max{Pd, Pa, σ2}. By (59), (67), and (70), it follows that P ∗d σ2∆h = O(1) (since
otherwise the upper bound in (70) would be smaller than the lower bound in (67)). This implies
that ∆R(u)conv(P∗) is a finite constant and, thus, we can write
R˜conv(P∗) + ∆R(u)conv(P∗) ≤
Td
T
E
[
log
(
1+P ∗d (σ
2
h−σ2∆h)‖h‖2
)]
+∆R(u)conv(P∗) (71)
≤ Td
T
logP + c′2 + o(1), (72)
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for some constant c′2 , TdT E
[
log k′(σ2h − σ2∆h + 1)‖h‖2
]
+∆R
(u)
conv(P∗). By combining (67) and
(72), we obtain the desired result R˜conv(Pl)−∆R(l)conv(Pl) .= R˜conv(P∗)+∆R(u)conv(P∗). Moreover,
since ∆R(u)conv(P∗) is finite, we have lim
P→∞
∆R
(u)
conv(P∗)/Rconv(P∗)=0, which completes the proof.
B. Proof of Corollary 2
The proof of the corollary relies on the fact that
R˜conv(Pl)−∆R(l)conv(Pl) ≤ R˜conv(P∗) + ∆R(u)conv(P∗) (73)
for any linear power allocation Pl.
Specifically, let us first consider the upper bound
Rconv(P∗)
(a)
≤ Td
T
E
[
log
(
1 + P ∗d σ
2
h‖h‖2/σ2
)]
+∆R(u)conv (74)
(b)
≤Td
T
log
(
1 + P ∗d σ
2
h/σ
2
)
+∆R(u)conv, (75)
where (a) is obtained by eliminating the negative terms in R˜conv(P) and by lower-bounding the
denominator of the first term by σ2, and (b) follows from Jensen’s inequality. By the argument
below (70), we know that P ∗d σ2∆h = O(1), and thus, R(u)conv(P∗) = O(1). Then, together with
(73) and (67), we have Td
T
log (1 + P ∗d σ
2
h/σ
2) + O(1) ≥ Td
T
logP + c1 + o(1), which implies
that P ∗d (P ) = Ω(P ). Moreover, since P ∗d σ2∆h = P ∗d σ2hσ2/(P ∗f σ2h + σ2) = O(1), it also follows
that P ∗f (P ) = Ω(P ∗d (P )) = Ω(P ). Furthermore, since σ2∆g/σ2∆h =
(P ∗
f
σ2
h
+σ2)/σ2
h
(P ∗
f
σ2g+σ
2)/σ2g
= O(1), we
know that Pdσ2∆g = (Pdσ2∆h)(σ2∆g/σ2∆h) = O(1). Therefore, the achievable secrecy rate can be
upper-bounded as
Rconv≤ R˜conv +∆R(u)conv (76)
≤ Td
T
E
[
log
(
1 + P ∗d σ
2
h‖h‖2/σ2
)]
− Td
T
E
log
1+ P ∗d (σ2g−σ2∆g)g†hh†g‖h‖2
P ∗dσ
2
∆g+P
∗
a (σ
2
g−σ2∆g)‖Nhˆg‖
2
nt−1
+P ∗aσ
2
∆g+σ
2
+∆R(u)conv (77)
(a)
=
Td
T
E
[
log
(
1+P ∗dσ
2
h‖h‖2/σ2
)]−Td
T
E
log
1+ P ∗d σ2g g†hh†g‖h‖2 +o(P ∗d )
P ∗aσ
2
g
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
+o(P ∗d )
+∆R(u)conv (78)
=
Td
T
logP ∗d −
Td
T
E
log
1 + P ∗d g†hh†g‖h‖2 + o(P ∗d )
P ∗a
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
+ o(P ∗d )
+ c3 + o(1), (79)
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where c3 = (Td/T )E
[
log
(
σ2h‖h‖2/σ2
)]
+ ∆R
(u)
conv is a finite constant and (a) holds since
P ∗d σ
2
∆g = O(1) and P ∗aσ2∆g = O(1). From (79), we can observe that the second term is a
negative finite constant only if P ∗a (P ) = Ω(P ∗d (P )) which implies that P ∗a (P ) = Ω(P ).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF (24) IN SECTION IV
By the weak law of large numbers (WLLN), we know that ‖N
hˆ
g‖2/(nt−1)→ 1 in probability
as nt →∞. That is, for any ǫ > 0, we have Pr(Aǫ)→ 1 (and, thus, Pr(Acǫ)→ 0) as nt →∞,
where Aǫ ,
{∣∣∣‖Nhˆg‖2nt−1 − 1∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ}. Therefore, for nt sufficiently large, the second expectation
term in (23) can be written as
E
log
1 + P ∗d g†hh†g‖h‖2
P ∗a
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
(nt−1)
∣∣∣∣∣Aǫ
Pr (Aǫ) + E
log
1 + P ∗d g†hh†g‖h‖2
P ∗a
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
(nt−1)
∣∣∣∣∣Acǫ
Pr (Acǫ)
≤ E
log
1 + P ∗d g†hh†g‖h‖2
P ∗a (1− ǫ)
∣∣∣∣∣Aǫ
Pr (Aǫ) + E
log
1 + P ∗d g†hh†g‖h‖2
P ∗a
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
(nt−1)
∣∣∣∣∣Acǫ
Pr (Acǫ) (80)
≤ E
log
1 + P ∗d g†hh†g‖h‖2
P ∗a (1− ǫ)
+ ǫnt . (81)
where
ǫnt , E
log
1 + P ∗d g†hh†g‖h‖2
P ∗a
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
(nt−1)
∣∣∣∣∣Acǫ
Pr (Acǫ) . (82)
Notice that ǫnt → 0 as nt → ∞ since the expectation inside (82) is finite. Then, by applying
Jensen’s inequality to the first term in (81), we have
E
log
1 + P ∗d g†hh†g‖h‖2
P ∗a (1− ǫ)
 ≤ log(1 + P ∗d
P ∗a (1− ǫ)
)
≤ log
(
P ∗a + P
∗
d
P ∗a (1− ǫ)
)
(83)
Finally, by (23) and (83), we have
R˜conv ≥ Td
T
log
P ∗
d
P ∗a
P ∗a+P
∗
d(
P ∗
d
+P ∗a
P ∗
f
+ 1
)
σ2
+
Td
T
E
[
log
(
σ2h‖h‖2(1− ǫ)
)]
+
Td
T
ǫnt + o(1) (84)
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3 AND COROLLARY 3
A. Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of Theorem 3 is an extension of the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix B and, thus,
is explained more concisely in the following.
Specifically, let us also consider a linear power allocation Pl , (Pr,l, Pf,l, Pfa,l, Pd,l, Pa,l) =
(αrP, αfP, αfaP, βdP, βaP ), where αr, αf , αfa , βd, and βa are positive constants chosen such
that the total power constraint in (11) is satisfied. Similar to Appendix B, it is sufficient to show
here that R˜DCE(Pl)−∆R(l)DCE(Pl) .= R˜DCE(P∗) + ∆R(u)DCE(P∗) and ∆R(u)DCE(P∗) = O(1).
By substituting Pl into (6) and (7), we can write the channel estimation error variances as
σ2∆h =
σ2h
(
Pfa,l
σ2
h
σ2
σ2+Pr,lσ
2
h
+ σ2
)
Pfa,l
σ2
h
σ2
σ2+Pr,lσ
2
h
+ σ2 + Pf,lσ
2
h
=
(αfa + αr)σ
2
αrαf
P−1 + o(P−1), (85)
σ2∆g =
Pfa,lσ
4
g + σ
2
g
Pfa,lσ
2
g + σ
2 + Pf,lσ2g
=
αfaσ
2
g
αfa + αf
+ o(1). (86)
Thus, we have
R˜DCE(Pl) =Td
T
E
log
1 + βdP (σ2h + o(1))‖h‖2
(βd + βa)
(αfa+αr)σ
2
αrαf
+ o(1) + σ2

− Td
T
E
log
1+ βdP
(
αfσ
2
g
αfa+αf
+ o(1)
)
g†hh
†
g
‖h‖2
(βd + βa)P
(
αfaσ
2
g
αfa+αf
+o(1)
)
+βaP
(
αfσ2g
αfa+αf
+o(1)
)
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
+σ2

(87)
=
Td
T
E
log
 βdPσ2h‖h‖2
(βd + βa)
(αfa+αr)σ
2
αrαf
+ σ2

− Td
T
E
log
1 + βdαf g†hh†g‖h‖2
(βd + βa)αfa + βaαf
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
+ o(1) (88)
=
Td
T
logP + c4 + o(1). (89)
where c4 , TdT E
[
log
(
βdσ
2
h
‖h‖2
(βd+βa)
(αfa
+αr)σ2
αrαf
+σ2
)]
− Td
T
E
[
log
(
1 +
βdαf
g†hh
†
g
‖h‖2
(βd+βa)αfa+βaαf
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
)]
. More-
over, by substituting Pl into (16), it can also be shown that ∆R(l)DCE(Pl) = O(1). Hence, we
have R˜DCE(Pl)−∆R(l)DCE(Pl) = TdT logP +O(1).
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Furthermore, by following the derivations in (68)-(70), it can also be shown that P ∗d σ2∆h = O(1)
and, thus, R˜DCE(P∗) + ∆R(u)DCE(P∗) ≤ TdT logP + O(1). Hence, it follows that R˜DCE(Pl) −
∆R
(l)
DCE(Pl) .= R˜DCE(P∗) + ∆R(u)DCE(P∗).
B. Proof of Corollary 3
The proofs of P ∗f (P ) = Ω(P ) and P ∗d (P ) = Ω(P ) are the same as those in Appendix B
for the case with conventional training. Hence, we prove here that either P ∗fa(P ) = Ω(P ) or
P ∗a (P ) = Ω(P ), and that P ∗r (P ) = Ω(P ∗fa(P )).
First, let us recall that
P ∗d σ
2
∆h =
P ∗d σ
2
h
(
P ∗faσ
2
∆hr
+ σ2
)
P ∗f σ
2
h + P
∗
fa
σ2∆hr + σ
2
= O(1). (90)
Due to the total power constraint, it holds that P ∗f σ2h + P ∗faσ
2
∆hr
+ σ2 = O(P ). Therefore,
together with the fact that P ∗d (P ) = Ω(P ), it follows that P ∗faσ
2
∆hr = O(1). Then, by (2), we
have P ∗faσ
2
∆hr
=
P ∗
fa
σ2
h
σ2
P ∗r σ
2
h
+σ2
= O(1), which implies that P ∗r (P ) = Ω(P ∗fa(P )).
Finally, to show that P ∗fa(P ) = Ω(P ) or P
∗
a (P ) = Ω(P ), let us rewrite the upper bound of
the achievable secrecy rate as follow:
R˜DCE +∆R
(u)
DCE (91)
≤ Td
T
E
[
log
(
1 + P ∗d σ
2
h‖h‖2
)]
− Td
T
E
log
1 + P ∗d (σ2g − σ2∆g)g†hh†g‖h‖2
P ∗d σ
2
∆g + P
∗
a (σ
2
g − σ2∆g)‖Nhˆg‖
2
nt−1
+ P ∗aσ
2
∆g + σ
2
+∆R(u)DCE (92)
=
Td
T
logP ∗d −
Td
T
E
log
1 + P ∗d (σ2g − σ2∆g)g†hh†g‖h‖2
P ∗d σ
2
∆g+P
∗
a (σ
2
g−σ2∆g)‖Nhˆg‖
2
nt−1
+P ∗aσ
2
∆g+σ
2
+O(1). (93)
The last equality comes from the fact that ∆R(u)DCE(P∗) = O(1) since P ∗d σ2∆h = O(1). Then, by
the fact that R˜DCE(P∗)+∆R(u)DCE(P∗) ≥ R˜DCE(Pl)−∆R(l)DCE(Pl) = TdT logP +O(1), it follows
that the second term in (93) must be O(1). This implies that term inside the logarithm must be
O(1). By substituting σ2∆g with (7) and using Tf = nt, this term can be written more explicitly
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as
P ∗d (σ
2
g − σ2∆g)g
†hh
†
g
‖h‖2
P ∗d σ
2
∆g + P
∗
a (σ
2
g − σ2∆g)‖Nhˆg‖
2
nt−1
+ P ∗aσ
2
∆g + σ
2
=
P ∗dP
∗
f σ
4
g
g†hh
†
g
‖h‖2
(P ∗d + P
∗
a )σ
2
g(P
∗
faσ
2
g + σ
2) + P ∗aP
∗
f σ
4
g
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
nt−1
+ σ2(P ∗faσ
2
g + σ
2 + σ2gP
∗
f )
.
Since P ∗f (P ) = Ω(P ) and P ∗d (P ) = Ω(P ), it is necessary to have either P ∗a (P ) = Ω(P ) or
P ∗fa(P ) = Ω(P ) (or both) in order for this term to scale as O(1). This completes the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4 IN SECTION V
To distinguish between the conventional and the DCE cases, let us denote the power al-
location in the conventional case as P = (Pf , Pd, Pa) and that in the DCE case as Q =
(Qr, Qfa , Qf , Qd, Qa). The approximate achievable secrecy rate R˜conv(Pˆ∗) is given by (23) and
the optimal power allocation Pˆ∗ in the conventional case is given in (28). Corollary 4 is proved
by showing that a lower bound of R˜DCE(Q∗), where Q∗ is the optimal power allocation in the
DCE case, is greater than an upper bound of R˜conv(Pˆ∗) if the condition in (41) is satisfied.
To obtain an upper bound for R˜conv(Pˆ∗), let us first note, by WLLN, that ‖Nhˆg¯‖2/(nt −
1) → 1 and g¯†h¯h¯†g¯/‖h¯‖2 → 1 in probability as nt → 1. Therefore, by defining A′ǫ ,
{|‖Nhˆg¯‖2
(nt−1)
− 1| ≤ ǫ, |g†hh†g
‖h‖2
− 1| ≤ ǫ}, the expectation inside second term of (23) can be
lower bounded by E
[
log
(
1 +
Pˆ ∗
d
(1−ǫ)
Pˆ ∗a (1+ǫ)
) ∣∣∣∣∣A′ǫ
]
Pr (A′ǫ)+E
[
log
(
1 +
Pˆ ∗
d
g†hh
†
g
‖h‖2
Pˆ ∗a
‖N
hˆ
g‖2
(nt−1)
) ∣∣∣∣∣A′ǫc
]
Pr (A′ǫ
c) =
log
(
1 +
Pˆ ∗
d
(1−ǫ)
Pˆ ∗a (1+ǫ)
)
+ ǫ′′nt , where ǫ′′nt → 0 as nt →∞. By substituting this into (23), we have
R˜conv(Pˆ∗) ≤ Td
T
E
log Pˆ ∗d σ2h‖h‖2(
Pˆ ∗
d
+Pˆ ∗a
Pˆ ∗
f
+ 1
)
σ2
− TdT log
(
1 +
Pˆ ∗d (1− ǫ)
Pˆ ∗a (1 + ǫ)
)
− Td
T
ǫ′′nt + o(1) (94)
=
T − nt
T
log
Pˆ ∗d
2
(
2Pˆ ∗
d
Pˆ ∗
f
+ 1
) + E [log σ2h‖h‖2(1 + ǫ)
σ2
]
+ ǫ′′nt
+ o(1). (95)
since Td = T −Tf = T −nt in the conventional training based scheme and Pˆ ∗d = Pˆ ∗a (c.f. (28)).
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To obtain a lower bound for R˜DCE(Q∗), we consider the power allocation policy Q♯ defined
such that Q♯r =
γTf
2Tr
Pˆ ∗f =
γnt
2
Pˆ ∗f , Q
♯
f = (1 − γ)Pˆ ∗f , Q♯fa = γ2 Pˆ ∗f , Q♯d = Pˆ ∗d , and Q♯a = Pˆ ∗a , where
γ is a constant in (0, 1). Since Q♯ is an arbitrarily chosen power allocation policy, it follows
that R˜DCE(Q∗) ≥ R˜DCE(Q♯). Notice that Q♯ is similar to Pˆ∗, but with γ portion of the training
energy moved to the reverse pilot signal and to AN in the training phase. It is also worthwhile
to note that, even though the power allocated to signal and AN in the data transmission phase,
i.e., Q♯d = Pˆ ∗d , and Q♯a = Pˆ ∗a , are the same, the total energy expended in the data transmission
phase is smaller than that in the conventional training based scheme since Td = T − nt − 1 in
this case (i.e., an additional channel use is spent for reverse training). Hence, the total energy
consumed by Q♯ is actually strictly less than the constraint PT .
By the fact that all power components in Q♯ scale linearly with P as in Pˆ∗ and by substituting
Q♯ into (35), we have
R˜DCE(Q♯)≥ T−nt −1
T
log Pˆ
∗
d
2Pˆ ∗
d
Pˆ ∗
f
1+nt
nt(1−γ)
+1
+ E
[
log
σ2h‖h‖2
σ2
]
− log 2−γ−(1−γ)ǫ
′
1−ǫ′+ǫ′γ +ǫ
′
nt
+o(1)
≥ T−nt −1
T
log Pˆ
∗
d
2Pˆ ∗
d
Pˆ ∗
f
1+nt
nt(1−γ)
+1
+ E
[
log
σ2h‖h‖2
σ2
]
− log 2−γ
1−ǫ′+ǫ
′
nt
+o(1). (96)
By (95) and (96), the difference between R˜DCE(Q∗) and R˜conv(Pˆ∗) can be lower bounded as
R˜DCE(Q∗)−R˜conv(Pˆ∗)
≥ T−nt −1
T
log 2
(
2Pˆ ∗
d
Pˆ ∗
f
+ 1
)
2Pˆ ∗
d
Pˆ ∗
f
1+nt
nt(1−γ)
+ 1
− log 1 + ǫ
1− ǫ′ − log(2− γ) + ǫ
′
nt

− 1
T
E
log Pˆ ∗dσ2h‖h‖2(1 + ǫ)/σ2
2
(
2Pˆ ∗
d
Pˆ ∗
f
+ 1
)
− T − ntT ǫ′′nt + o(1) (97)
=
T−nt −1
T
log 2
(√ nt
T−nt
+ 1
)
√
nt
T−nt
1+nt
nt(1−γ)
+ 1
− log 1 + ǫ
1− ǫ′ − log(2− γ) + ǫ
′
nt

− 1
T
E
[
log
PTσ2h‖h‖2(1 + ǫ)/σ2
4
(√
nt +
√
T − nt
)2
]
− T − nt
T
ǫ′′nt + o(1) (98)
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The expectation inside the second term of (98) can be upper bounded as
E
[
log
PTσ2h‖h‖2(1+ǫ)/σ2
4
(√
nt +
√
T − nt
)2
]
≤E
[
log
(
PTσ2h‖h‖2(1+ǫ)
4Tσ2
)]
≤ log
(
Pσ2hnt(1+ǫ)
4σ2
)
, (99)
where the last inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. Therefore, the difference R˜DCE(Q∗)−
R˜conv(Pˆ∗) can be further bounded as
R˜DCE(Q∗)− R˜conv(Pˆ∗)
≥T−nt−1
T
log
2
(√ nt
T−nt
+ 1
)
(√ nt
T−nt
1+nt
nt(1−γ)
+ 1
)
(2− γ)
− 1
T
log
Pσ2hnt(1+ǫ)
4σ2
− T−nt−1
T
log
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ′ +
T−nt−1
T
ǫ′nt −
T − nt
T
ǫ′′nt + o(1) (100)
When P and nt are sufficiently large, we can choose arbitrary small ǫ, ǫ′ > 0 such that ǫnt , ǫ′nt ,
and o(1) can be neglected. Hence, for R˜DCE(Q∗)− R˜conv(Pˆ∗) > 0, it is sufficient to have
(T − nt − 1) log
 2
(
nt +
√
(T − nt)nt
)
1 + nt + (1− γ)
√
(T − nt)nt
· 1− γ
2− γ
 > log(Pσ2hnt
4σ2
)
(101)
By selecting γ = 1/2, the term inside the logarithm on the left-hand-side can be rewritten as
4nt+4
√
(T−nt)nt
6(1+nt)+3
√
(T−nt)nt
=
(12nt+2
√
(T−nt)nt)+10
√
(T−nt)nt
18(1+nt)+9
√
(T−nt)nt
. (102)
Notice that, if 12nt + 2
√
(T − nt)nt ≥ 20(1 + nt), i.e., if
T ≥ (4nt + 10)
2
nt
+ nt, (103)
the left-hand-side of (101) is lower bounded by (T − nt − 1) log (10/9). Therefore, we have
R˜DCE(Q∗)− R˜conv(P∗) > 0 if (T − 1− nt) log10 (10/9) > log10 (Pσ2hnt/4σ2), which yields the
sufficient condition
T ≥ 22 log10
(
Pσ2hnt
4σ2
)
+ 1 + nt (104)
since (log10(10/9))−1 ≤ 22. By (103) and (104), we obtain the result in (41).
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